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A Case Study of the Federal Judiciary's Role in 
Court-Ordered Busing: The Professional and 
Personal Experiences of U.S. District Judge 
Robert R. Merhige, Jr. 
by Ronald]. Bacigal* and Margaret I. Bacigal** 
~troduction 
Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. assumed the office of federal dis-
trict judge for the Eastern District of Virginia in August of 1967. 
Upon discovering that federal judges had lifetime tenure, Merhige's 
father advised: "Take the job. You'll live forever." Neither the elder 
Merhige nor any observer could have foreseen the turbulence that 
would engulf Judge Merhige's life on the bench. Two weeks after 
his appointment, Merhige was faced with government efforts to si-
lence militant black leader H. Rap Brown. Soon thereafter Merhige 
confronted numerous civil rights and anti-war issues, gaining some 
immediate notoriety as the first federal judge to declare that the 
Vietnam conflict was a war within the meaning of the Constitution. 
Throughout his twenty-year career, Judge Merhige has attracted 
national attention with a docket full of landmark cases. A small 
sampling includes the "Kepone" pollution case, in which Merhige 
imposed the largest recorded criminal fine under federal anti-pollu-
tion laws; the "Westinghouse Uranium" case, in which Merhige 
became the first federal judge to hold court outside the United 
States; and the still pending bankruptcy proceedings centering 
around the Robins Pharmaceutical Company, manufacturer of the 
• Ronald Bacigal is a Professor of Law at the T.C. Williams School of Law, University of 
Richmond. 
•• Margaret I. Bacigal is an associate with the law firm of Williams, Mullen, Christian & Dob-
bins, Richmond, Va. 
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Dalkon Shield. 
A forthcoming authorized biography recounts the highlights of 
Judge Merhige's controversial career. Excerpted in this article are 
two chapters dealing with the most notorious and turbulent period 
of Merhige's tenure. Merhige's candid reflections upon school inte-
gration and court-ordered busing reveal a major participant's per-
spective of a dramatic stage in this country's history. 
I. Caught in the Middle 
During the height of the school busing controversy, Merhige was 
lambasted as an activist judge pushing Virginia beyond the law and 
toward his personal view of a racially mixed society. Merhige, how-
ever, began the process of desegregation as somewhat of a moderate. 
He entered the desegregation controversy in the middle, long after 
the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 1 and long before the issues of affirmative action and reverse 
discrimination were addressed. 2 His initial decisions sought the 
middle ground, following the lead of other federal judges in at-
tempting to move the South slowly from outright defiance to grad-
ual acceptance of desegregation. 
Merhige's efforts to tread the middle ground often subjected him 
to criticism from both sides. "Every time I render a decision I make 
one party to the case mad at me," he muses, "but sometimes I man-
age to get both sides mad at me in the same case."3 From the politi-
cal right came calls for his impeachment, the picketing of his home 
by a color guard of the Segregationist States Rights Party, and an 
unsuccessful attempt to arrest him by the grand dragon of the Vir-
ginia Ku Klux Klan. The grand dragon unknowingly approached 
Merhige in the hallway and asked for directions to the United 
States Attorney's Office. The Klansman then walked into the office 
and tried to get an arrest warrant sworn out against Merhige. 
From the political left came charges that Merhige's cautious ap-
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
1 See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (affirmative action); Regents 
of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (reverse discrimination). 
• Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from interviews with the Honorable Robert R. Mer-
hige, Jr., conducted in Richmond, Virginia throughout 1985-86. 
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proach amounted to open defiance of the United States Supreme 
Court's mandate to desegregate southern schools. Merhige clung to 
his cautious approach even though Samuel W. Tucker, a prominent 
civil rights lawyer, warned him that "you don't help the dog by 
cutting a little of his tail off at a time." Through this process of 
slow accommodation, however, Merhige ultimately took school inte-
gration further than any other federal judge, and further than the 
Supreme Court was willing to go. 
Merhige presided over Bradley v. School Board;' the case in 
which most of the battles over the integration of Richmond's schools 
were fought. During the Bradley litigation, Merhige was often crit-
icized for being an activist judge who shaped the law to suit his 
personal preferences. A divided Supreme Court's eventual repudia-
tion of Merhige's Bradley decision6 lends superficial support to this 
view. His judicial decisions, however, more accurately present an 
example of how the law can shape and mold a judge. 
Merhige brought to the bench an absence of preconceptions about 
school integration, confessing with some embarrassment, "I had 
been too busy with my own life to worry enough about others. As a 
judge, you must be concerned with other people." When forced to 
confront racial discrimination, a sometimes reluctant Merhige 
moved inexorably toward the logical fulfillment of the forces that 
had been set in motion by the Brown case. Merhige's school inte-
gration decisions can be best understood by placing them in the 
broad context in which they arose. 
In the 1954 Brown decision, the United States Supreme Court set 
forth the basic premise that separate is not equal. This modest be-
ginning outlawed segregation in public schools but did not mandate 
affirmative steps to integrate. Virginia led the nation in responding 
to this modest premise with absolute defiance. The massive resis-
tance movement in Virginia encompassed school closings, the cut-off 
of state education funds, and the establishment of tuition grants for 
private segregated schools.8 The power structure in Virginia geared 
' 315 F. Supp. 325 (1970), vacated, 324 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Va. 1971); 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. 
Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), afrd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 
(1973). 
• 412 U.S. 92 (1973). 
• See generally J. Ely, The Crisis of Conservative Virginia: The Byrd Organization and the Polit-
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up to frustrate desegregation, and by default the task of enforcing 
Brown fell to the federal courts. Tucker, a chief architect of the 
desegregation movement, observed: "We never got to first base in 
the state courts. When Chief Justice Earl Warren spoke in Wil-
liamsburg, the Virginia Supreme Court even refused to appear on 
the same platform with him. "7 
The rigid posture of the state government made a judicial con-
frontation inevitable. Federal district judges could not ignore the 
Supreme Court edict, yet they were in a ciangerous power vacuum. 
Courts must depend on the public's acceptance of the sanctity of 
law, for in a democratic society judicial action is only as effective as 
public support will allow. The refusal of Virginia's political and 
legal leadership to comply with Brown placed intolerable pressures 
on the federal district judges. In . a contest for public opinion, the 
judges could not match the appeal ef the popular Byrd political ma-
chine. 8 The district judges had only two choices: act or resign. 
Judge Sterling Hutchenson of Richmond was a long-standing 
Byrd loyalist who tried to delay desegregation. After repeated rever-
sals by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, he chose to resign 
rather than to enforce the law. In contrast, Judge Walter E. Hoff-
man of Norfolk reveled in his status as an old foe of the Byrd or-
ganization. He readily declared one of Virginia's massive resistance 
statutes unconstitutional on its face. "The pattern is plain," he de-
clared. "The legislature has adopted procedures to def eat the Brown 
decision."9 Senator Byrd retorted that Judge Hoffman "has discred-
ited his judicial robes by acting with such prejudice," and the Rich-
mond News Leader called Hoffman a "third-rate Republican poli-
tician."10 Until the mid-1960s, when the United States Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare threatened to cut off federal 
funds to Virginia if the resistance did not stop, Virginia district 
ics of Massive Resistance (I 976). 
7 Interview with Samuel W. Tucker, private counsel, Hill, Tucker & Marsh, in Richmond, Vir-
ginia (March 3, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Tucker interview]. The Virginia Supreme Court did ulti-
mately invalidate massive resistance in Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 439 (1959). 
1 The "Byrd machine" bears the name of Harry Flood Byrd who served as Governor of Virginia 
from 1926 to 1930, and as a U.S. Senator from 1933 to 1965. For a study of the Byrd political 
machine during the massive resistance era, see J. Wilkinson, Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of 
Virginia Politics 1945-1966, 113-54 (I 968). 
• Adkins v. School Bd. [of Newport News, Va.], 148 F. Supp. 430, 446 (E.D. Va. 1957). 
10 Ely, supra note 6, at 191. 
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judges were frustrated in their efforts to desegregate the state's 
schools. 
By the time Merhige assumed the bench in 1967, the absolute 
defiance embodied in the massive resistance movement had been 
broken, and many of the legalistic delaying maneuvers had been 
invalidated. Virginia had grudgingly moved from school closings, to 
pupil placement boards, to tuition grants, to acceptance of the fact 
that state-enforced segregation of the schools would not be counte-
nanced by the federal courts. Virginia sought, however, to hold the 
line at the elimination of state-enforced segregation. Freedom-of-
choice plans were adopted to prevent overt discrimination, but Vir-
ginia refused to take affirmative steps to promote integration. State 
Senator Fredrick T. Gray presented Virginia's position to the U.S. 
Supreme Court: 
Desegregation (i.e., the elimination of state enforced segregation 
solely because of race) is a legal question; integration (i.e., the 
compulsory assignment of pupils to achieve intermingling) is an 
educational question - best left for decision by educators, for edu-
cational purposes, on the basis of educational criteria. A freedom of 
choice plan alone honors this distinction.11 
Virginia's position was rejected in Green v. School Board,12 
when the Supreme Court held that the ultimate goal of Brown was. 
"a unitary non-racial system of public education."13 Any plan to 
eliminate desegregation was to be measured by its practical effec-
tiveness. A theoretically neutral freedom-of-choice plan could not 
pass constitutional muster when other alternatives would integrate 
the schools more quickly and more effectively. In three years of op-
eration not one white child had chosen to attend a black school in 
New Kent County, and 85 percent of blacks still attended identifi-
ably black schools. Recognizing that centuries of discrimination 
could not be overcome by benign indifference, the Supreme Court 
moved from the modest beginning of "Thou shalt not segregate" to 
the position "Thou shalt integrate." Affirmative action had become 
an integral part of constitutional law. As one district judge, Frank 
11 Brief for the Respondents at 32, Green v. School Bd. [of New Kent County, Va.], 391 U.S. 430 
(1968). 
11 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
11 Id. at 436. 
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Johnson of Alabama, observed: "Just saying 'Don't do it again' is 
not enough when they've been doing it for one hundred years .... 
You've got to provide some sort of positive relief for past discrimi-
natory practices."14 
When freedom-of-choice plans did not work in practice, the Su-
preme Court charged the district courts "with the affirmative duty 
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary 
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and 
branch." 111 The duty to take affirmative steps would subsequently 
start the buses rolling in Virginia and throughout the South. The 
Supreme Court had also lost patience with Virginia's delaying tac-
tics. Because of the complexities of dismantling the segregated 
school system, the South had been permitted to move with "deliber-
ate speed."16 Some ten years after Brown, the Supreme Court an-
nounced, "The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out. .. " 17 
In Green, the Court held that "The burden on a school board today 
is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, 
and promises realistically to work now."18 Merhige read this lan-
guage as a clear mandate to the district courts "to do it and to do it 
now." 
After Green, Merhige was surprised to find just how many 
school integration cases were pending on his docket. He remembers 
his first six months on the bench as: 
... particularly busy. I didn't have the time to familiarize myself 
with the many school cases which lay dormant while Virginia's 
freedom-of-choice plan was pending in the Supreme Court. The 
day after freedom-of-choice was struck down in the Green decision, 
Sam Tucker, lead counsel for the Virginia NAACP, was in my 
court moving on every pending case. I soon found myself with 
prime responsibility for integrating most of Virginia's schools, be-
cause I had to deal with my own Eastern District and also with 
most of the Western District of Virginia. 
Judge Ted Dalton of the Western District had been a member of 
the state legislature, a twice-defeated candidate for governor, and an 
" R. Kennedy, Jr., Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. 255 (1978). 
•• Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38. 
10 Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
17 Griffin v. School Bd. [of Prince Edward County, Va.], 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964). 
18 391 U.S. at 439. 
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outspoken critic of the massive resistance movement. Dalton con-
cluded that it would be inappropriate for him to rule upon the 
school cases in light of his former involvement with the Virginia 
political structure. Merhige took the additional cases, even though 
he would be required to travel throughout the state to evaluate nu-
merous school board plans to integrate the rural counties. "I wasn't 
looking for the business,'' he remembers, "but my life might have 
been easier if my burden of cases had been a little bit heavier." 
Dalton had eased Merhige's burden by retaining jurisdiction over 
one school case, in Dalton's hometown of Roanoke. During a period 
when Merhige was taking most of the heat for court-ordered inte-
gration and busing, Judge Dalton rejected part of the Roanoke 
school board's integration plan for elementary schools because it 
called for too much busing.19 Although the decision was vacated and 
the case remanded by the Fourth Circuit,20 the local newspapers 
questioned why Virginia had been cursed with Merhige, instead of 
having an understanding judge like Dalton. 
Merhige, however, has no bitterness over the incident: 
I don't know Dalton's motives, but he is a man of such integrity 
and so little guile that he would not have deliberately sandbagged 
me on the Roanoke case. It's the only dirty thing Dalton ever did 
to me, and I believe he was totally unaware of how tough he made 
it for me. 
·Intentional or not, Merhige was left alone on the hot seat, caught in 
the middle of the confrontation between the strongly committed ad-
vocates on both sides of the desegregation controversy. 
Aligned with the NAACP and leading the fight for integration 
were Oliver Hill, Samuel W. Tucker, and Henry L. Marsh, III. As 
lawyers, Hill and Tucker had been instrumental in the Brown deci-
sion, and had had a professional history of involvement with the 
civil rights movement. As black men, they had had a personal his-
tory of experience with racial discrimination. Oliver Hill's first ex-
posure to racial prejudice came when he was eight years old: 
Lots of children in the neighborhood were gathering bottles and 
taking them down to the distillery on Norfolk Avenue in Roanoke. 
10 See Green v. School Bd., 316 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Va. 1970). 
•
0 See Adams v. School Dist. 5, 444 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1971). 
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They got a penny for them. I gathered up an armful of bottles, 
whiskey bottles they were, and carried them up to the distillery. I 
went looking for somebody, went up on the second floor. I saw 
several men, one of them said, "Oh let's get the little nigger." 
They started chasing me and of course I dropped the bottles and 
started running around. Then they said, "Let's castrate him." I 
didn't understand the word "castrate," but whatever it was, I knew 
it was something I didn't want to get involved with. Really, I was 
terrified. Finally, I eluded them, got down the steps and got out on 
the street.11 
Sam Tucker's experience was more basic: "I got involved in the 
civil rights movement on June 18, 1913, in Alexandria [Virginia] 
- I was born black. "22 Tucker was a pioneer in the civil rights 
movement, having organized a 1940 sit-in at a public library in Al-
exandria. When denied a library card because of his race, Tucker 
sent a half-dozen blacks into the library. Each man was denied a 
library card, and each of them removed a book from the shelf and 
sat at a separate reading table. No white person would sit at a table 
with a black man, thus the blacks had effectively monopolized the 
library's reading room. They were arrested for disturbing the peace 
and led out of the library before an alerted photographer from the 
Washington Post. Tucker cherishes the resulting photograph which 
hangs on his office wall because the six black men have their heads 
held high while the lone white police officer is attempting to conceal 
his face. 
The junior member of the legal triumvirate was Henry L. Marsh 
III, who would later serve as Richmond's first black mayor. Marsh 
was Virginia Union University's student government president dur-
ing the massive resistance era, and he decided upon a legal career 
after watching Oliver Hill speak to the Virginia Legislature. 
"When Oliver spoke to the General Assembly that day," Marsh 
recalls, 
It was very impressive to see a tall black man stand up before a 
joint session of the General Assembly, shake his fist at them and 
tell them, "If you do this, we will have it thrown out and we will 
do this to you." And his finger was shaking and his veins were 
11 Richmond Times-Dispatch, Feb. 10, 1986, at Bl, col. 1. 
.. Tucker interview, supra note 7. 
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throbbing. And I was frightened for them.28 
On the other side of the desegregation issue, the performance 
level of the attorneys varied greatly. Professional and competent 
representation was provided by State Senator Gray, and by E. 
Dortch Warriner, who would subsequently join Merhige on the 
Federal District bench. Although he lost most of his cases before 
Merhige, Gray impressed the judge with the sincerity of his com-
mitment and the high level of his legal arguments.24 Merhige, how-
ever, had little respect for Virginia's Attorney General's Office 
which was playing politics with the integration issue, with the 
many politicians involved who lacked the courage to support inte-
gration, and with the Richmond City Council which refused to take 
a position on the most crucial issue of the day - consolidation of 
the city and county schools. 
In the rural counties, the level of opposition and the course of 
integration varied from community to community. In some counties 
such as New Kent, local leaders exhausted their legal appeals to the 
Supreme Court, then went to work and accomplished integration 
with a minimum of disruption. Charlottesville was another example 
of a peaceful transition to integrated schools, due largely to the 
leadership of John S. Battle, Jr. 211 In such counties, strong local 
leadership kept things running smoothly, although Merhige recog-
nized that school integration was difficult for everyone: "When you 
deal with emotional issues and matters involving people's children, 
people are not going to be objective." 
For Merhige, however, integration could work when "strong 
leadership is offered on the part of school, county, and city officials. 
As I noted in one of the Bradley opinions, such leadership fulfills 'a 
public trust to encourage what may well be considered one of the 
most precious resources of a community; an attitude of prompt ad-
herence to the law ... .' "28 Reflecting upon his diverse exper-
•• Richmond Times-Dispatch, Feb. 10, 1986, at Bl, col. I. 
•• Merhige remembers Gray as a sharp contrast to the "country lawyer" who once came into court 
bragging about the progress the community was making - how they had taken a black into the 
Chamber of Commerce last year. When asked about the pace of progress required by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Green, the lawyer replied that he wasn't familiar with the case . 
.. Mr. Battle is a senior partner with the law firm of McGuire, Woods, Battle & Booth, Rich-
mond, Virginia . 
.. Bradley, 53 F.R.D. 28, 41 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
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iences in various rural counties, Merhige evolved a simple formula: 
"Just give me good lawyers on both sides, committed local leader-
ship, and we could all make integration work." 
Nevertheless, integration did not work smoothly in those rural 
counties where Merhige encountered both sincere opposition and 
the lowest form of rabble-rousing. He found it easy to respect those 
whose legal opposition derived from deeply-held beliefs, so long as 
they accepted the law of the land once the highest courts had spo-
ken. Merhige explained that: 
I always encouraged the parties to appeal each of my decisions in 
the hope that they would show some patriotism in sublimating per-
sonal beliefs to the rule of law. I had the feeling, and I was just as 
wrong as I could be, that we would get the cooperation of everyone 
once the appeals were settled. 
Sam Tucker shared Merhige's disillusionment with the public's re-
action to the school integration decisions: "My biggest disappoint-
ment was to learn that white people didn't have the great respect 
for the law that I always thought they did. "27 
Although Merhige was sometimes disappointed with the lack of 
positive_ leadership, his anger was reserved for those leaders who 
sought to use the school situation for their political advantage. He 
cited instances when 
local leaders came in to my chambers to privately offer assurances 
that they understood that I had to enforce the law. They asked me 
to understand, however, that they must offer public opposition for 
political reasons. I was willing to take the heat when it would ease 
the task of integration. As I said from the bench, '[Political leaders 
and school administrators J may well have, in their views, been re-
sponsive to the community .... [Their] burdens will be lessened 
somewhat ... if [their actions] ... are done so by mandate of 
this Court. Indeed the Court decrees it its duty and responsibility 
to do so.'18 
However, many of those same individuals who privately recognized 
a judge's responsibility to enforce the law would then leave the 
courthouse to urge mob violence and threaten blood in the streets. 
When the Justice Department considered a criminal prosecution for 
11 Tucker interview, supra note 7. 
•• Bradley, 338 F. Supp. at 115. 
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one such incident, those same individuals again privately appeared 
before Merhige to apologize and admit that they had gone too far. 
When the local leadership opposed integration, the communities 
frequently resorted to every tactic imaginable to defy the courts. 
"Whenever possible," explained Merhige, "I tried to proceed slowly 
in order to give the community time to adjust." Unfortunately, that 
time was often used to establish private segregated schools or create 
some new form of evasion. In one community, the school board 
asked for more time to make physical changes in the converted 
schools, such as lowering the height of the urinals so that elemen-
tary students could be accommodated. Merhige remembers the inci-
dent with a smile: 
They made the claim with a straight face, so I was forced into a 
fact-finding inspection to determine that the urinals were really not 
all that high. Can you imagine the scene! Another fact-finding in-
spection produced a stroke of luck when I walked out the back 
door of the school and spotted a yellow school bus. I turned to the 
school officials and asked, 'I thought you said that you didn't have 
any buses to transport the children?' The feeble response was that 
the buses were publicly owned and the children had to pay ten 
cents to ride them. Technically, the buses were part of the public 
transportation system, but no one except school children could get 
on the buses to go anywhere. 
The delays in the rural counties could not stop integration, but 
they did buy enough time for the composition of the U.S. Supreme 
Court to change. The NAACP and other civil rights groups pur-
sued a deliberate strategy of moving against the rural counties first, 
leaving the major cities for last. Sam Tucker remembers that the 
strategy was not part of any grand plan, but was simply a reflection 
of his small town origins. Tucker admits that he "felt more comfort-
able with rural counties. Integration in large cities was just too 
complex. "29 By the time Bradley reached the Supreme Court, the 
Court's composition had changed and the Nixon Justices began a 
retreat from the full ramifications of the Brown decision. Merhige 
suggested that the decision to focus on the counties proved to be the 
major tactical mistake of the school integration movement in Vir-
ginia. In his view, "had they gone after the cities first, Virginia 
•• Tucker interview, supra note 7. 
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would have had consolidated school districts. They had the court for 
it." 
The pre-Nixon Supreme Court did in fact approve Merhige's 
first court-ordered integration of a city school system in Wright v. 
Emporia.so Until 1967, Emporia was a "town" under Virginia law, 
which meant that it was a subordinate part of Greensville County. 
In 1967, for reasons unrelated to school integration, Emporia be-
came a "city" and thus politically independent from the surround-
ing county. With political independence came the responsibility of 
establishing a separate city school system. Emporia, however, en-
tered into a contract with the county whereby the county continued 
to administer the schools as before. Although Emporia shared the 
costs of the county school system, it did not participate in policy-
making decisions. In 1970, Merhige ordered Greensville County to 
desegregate its school system, and two weeks after the order, Empo-
ria sought to withdraw from its contract with the county and to 
establish separate city schools.s1 Merhige recalled: 
[T]he issue presented to me was a precursor of the Richmond con-
solidation case: Could a federal court enjoin local officials from 
creating a new school district when the existing district had not 
completed the process of dismantling a system of enforced segrega-
tion? I held that because the city and county functioned as one unit 
at the time the segregated system was created, they must properly 
be treated as one unit for purposes of dismantling that system. I 
also had misgivings about the city officials' motives for the split 
with Greensville County. There was certainly some intent to avoid 
busing rural blacks into the city schools, but the government offi-
cials also had a legitimate feeling that the city was financially able 
to provide a superior quality educational program. 
To Merhige, the determining factor was not the motivation of the 
local officials, but the practical effect on the school system. Separa-
tion by the city at that time would have constituted an impermissi-
ble interference with the standing integration order, because separa-
tion would have reduced the percentage of whites in the county 
schools while increasing their percentage in city schools.s2 
80 407 U.S. 451 (1972). 
•• Sec Emporia, 407 U.S. at 456. 
aa The unified system was 66 percent black, a separate system in Emporia would have been 52 
percent black, while the county would have been 72 percent black. See e.g., Wright v. School Bd. [of 
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The Fourth Circuit reversed Merhige because it did not find any 
discriminatory intent on the part of Emporia officials. 33 The Su-
preme Court, however, reinstated Merhige's decision and agreed 
with him that discriminatory intent was not the controlling factor. 
Rather, the Court said that "[t]he measure of any desegregation 
plan is its effectiveness. " 34 Even if the political leaders were at-
tempting to improve the quality of education for city children, such 
benefits could not be purchased at the price of a substantially ad-
verse effect upon the viability of the county system.36 
Merhige regarded the Supreme Court decision as vindication for 
his holding that political subdivisions could not be manipulated to 
frustrate desegregation. The Supreme Court opinion, which Mer-
hige predicted, gave him: 
some guidance for the Richmond school consolidation decision 
[Bradley] which presented the other side of the Emporia case. If 
Emporia could not divide a single unit into separate parts in order 
to frustrate integration, then separate parts could be consolidated 
into one unit in order to facilitate integration. That seemed to me 
to be the logical corollary of the Emporia case. 
Merhige did not foresee, however, the shift in viewpoint precipi-
tated by the Nixon appointments to the Supreme Court. 
The Emporia case marked the first break in the Supreme Court's 
longstanding unanimity on school desegregation. All four of Nixon's 
appointees dissented in the case, and Chief Justice Burger's dissent-
ing opinion contained an omen of what lay ahead for Richmond. 
Burger maintained that a district court's power was limited when it 
dealt with "totally separate political entities."36 The Chief Justice's 
position would ultimately lead to the reversal of Merhige's consoli-
dation decision in the Bradley case. 
Not only were Merhige's legal decisions caught up in the shifting 
power structure of the Supreme Court, he also became indirectly, 
but personally, embroiled in some of the infighting among the J us-
tices. In one of the "strangest performances in the history of the 
Greensville County, Va.], 309 F. Supp. 671, 678 (E.D. Va. 1970). 
•• Emporia, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971). 
M Emporia, 407 U.S. at 462 (quoting Davis v. School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971)). 
•• Id. at 468. 
81 Id. at 478 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
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Court,"37 Chief Justice Burger attempted to put a conservative gloss 
on the Court's previous approval of busing as a tool of desegrega-
tion. In correspondence marked, "For the personal attention of the 
Judge," the Chief Justice admonished district judges not to overstep 
their bounds, and he threatened personally to block any court order 
requiring three hours of daily bus travel. 38 
Burger's letter prompted calls from a number of irate judges, and 
Merhige recalls one touching letter sent by a judge's wife. She chas-
tised the Chief Justice for stirring things up while her husband was 
the one being physically threatened for doing what he believed the 
Supreme Court had directed him to do. Burger's letter also elicited 
a response from Justice Douglas, and the media gave considerable 
attention to the unseemly infighting between the Justices. 
Merhige endeavored to stay out of the controversy because of his 
involvement with the pending Richmond integration cases, but his 
attempt to avoid the glare of publicity failed. An ABC News re-
porter asked Merhige to discuss school busing and Burger's letter. 
Merhige refused all comment, but on the way out of the courthouse 
for lunch, the reporter approached him with a camera crew. Mer-
hige gave the newsman a fierce scowl and said, "I told you that I 
wasn't talking." The reporter pleaded, "Make believe we're speak-
ing. I have no microphone and this is just background film." Mer-
hige and the newsman compared notes on the quality of a local 
restaurant's lunch counter, but that is not what appeared on the 
evening news. The reporter discussed Burger's letter and reported 
that a number of judges were upset with the Chief Justice. As the 
reporter made his oral report, the nation viewed film of Merhige 
scowling at this reporter. No one missed the implication that Mer-
hige was one of the judges upset with Burger. At the close of the 
newscast Merhige's mother called to ask, "Can they fire you, 
Junior?" 
Merhige laughs about it now, but at the time the television inci-
dent focused unwanted attention on the integration difficulties in 
Richmond. Merhige had been caught in the middle of the powerful 
forces dividing the country over the busing issue. He was to move 
17 L. Graglia, Disaster by Decree: The Supreme Court Decisions on Race and the Schools 140 
(1976). 
88 Id. 
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from the middle to the forefront in the Richmond school consolida-
tion case. 
The Richmond School Consolidation Case 
Merhige's decision to consolidate suburban and city schools was 
foretold some seven years beforehand by Judge Skelly Wright of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Judge Wright 
felt that it was "inconceivable" that the Supreme Court would 
"long sit idly by, watching Negro children crowded into inferior 
schools while whites flee to the suburbs to place their children in 
vastly superior, predominantly white schools."39 He saw the Su-
preme Court acting "if the problem persists and the states fail to 
correct the evil."40 It was Robert Merhige, not the Supreme Court, 
who acted to correct the problem. 
Merhige inherited the Bradley v. School Board case from Judge 
John D. Butzner, whose elevation to the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals created the district court vacancy filled by Merhige. Judge 
Butzner had initially held that Richmond's "feeder school system"41 
was a reasonable start toward desegregation. When the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed Butzner, he ordered Richmond to implement a free-
dom-of-choice plan. The plaintiffs appealed the freedom-of-choice 
plan to the Supreme Court, where the issue was evaded and the 
case remanded for a hearing on integrating the faculties of Rich-
mond schools.42 The Bradley plaintiffs temporarily acquiesced in 
this disposition while pressing their challenge of freedom-of-choice 
plans in Green v. New Kent Co. When the Green decision struck 
down freedom-of-choice plans, the Bradley case was back before 
Merhige. 
Merhige approached the Bradley case with considerable caution. 
In June 1970, he enjoined Richmond from constructing new school 
buildings only until such construction could be assessed in light of 
so G. Metcalf, From Little Rock to Boston 179 (1983). 
•• Id. 
41 Under the feeder school system, each student was assigned to an elementary school, then auto-
matically to junior high and then high school within the same section. Green v. School Bd., 304 F.2d 
118, 120 (4th Cir. 1962). 
•• Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (per curiam). 
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an overall plan for integrating the schools.43 The Richmond school 
board had conceded in open court that they were not operating a 
non-discriminatory school system as required by the Constitution.44 
The Board then submitted a new integration plan prepared by 
the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 
The plan sought to create neighborhood schools but did not provide 
for busing because of an unwritten departmental policy that prohib-
ited consideration of transportation resources as a means of achiev-
ing integration. Merhige "found the neighborhood school plan to be 
totally unacceptable, a conclusion that should have been obvious in 
view of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Swann." In Swann, the 
Fourth Circuit, and subsequently the Supreme Court, had approved 
the use of busing so long as it did not pose intolerable practical 
problems. 411 
The school board's plan for neighborhood schools could not oper-
ate successfully in Richmond because the neighborhoods themselves 
were rigidly segregated. Overt discrimination by the federal and 
state government, as well as private business, had created black 
ghettoes and white enclaves within the city. It was obvious to Mer-
hige that neighborhood schools could not operate "unless and until 
there is a dismantling of the all Black residential areas. "46 Short of 
altering existing housing patterns, Merhige felt that his only option 
was to order busing between the neighborhood schools in order to 
achieve meaningful racial integration. 
The plaintiffs in Bradley submitted an integration plan drafted 
by Gordon Foster, a noted desegregation planning expert, that 
called for extensive busing. Merhige rejected the Foster plan be-
cause school was to open in two weeks and immediate adoption of 
the plan "would be detrimental to the educational values which the 
Court [was] satisfied [could] be maintained by less precipitous ac-
tion."47 Instead of the Foster plan, Merhige approved an interim 
plan which called for less busing. The court-ordered bus trips 
ranged from 5.8 to 12 miles, and the average trip during rush hour 
•• See Bradley, 315 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Va. 1970). 
•• Bradley, 317 F. Supp. 555, 558 (E.D. Va. 1970). 
•• Swann v. Board of Educ., 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), affd, 402 U.S. I (1971). 
•• Bradley, 317 F. Supp. at 566. 
47 Id. at 571. 
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took thirty-five minutes. It was obvious that this interim plan was 
not constitutionally adequate, but Merhige felt that it was at least a 
"reasonable start" toward disestablishment of the segregated school 
system. 
In light of the available options, Merhige believes that he acted 
with moderation. From a strict constructionist view, the school 
board could have been ordered to implement the Foster plan at 
once. The Supreme Court's decisions in Green and Swann had been 
strong mandates to order the immediate termination of segregated 
school systems. Merhige, however, wanted to avoid absolute dogma 
and tried to apply a rule of reason. Courts must accord school 
boards a modicum of flexibility in their approaches, and Merhige 
warned the parties that only reasonable integration plans would re-
ceive the court's approval. 
Given Merhige's attempt to apply a rule of reason to busing and 
school integration, it is ironic that his decision resulted in his vilifi-
cation by the Richmond community. He was criticized unmercifully 
in newspaper editorials, there were renewed calls for his impeach-
ment, and there was even an ominous threat of a "searching investi-
gation into ... [his] background and conduct."'8 Merhige accepted 
such public criticism because "I learned soon enough that the na-
ture of this job is that you must have a tough skin." However, the 
intrusions into his personal life were more difficult: 
My dog was shot. Our guest house, where my then 75-year-old 
mother-in-law lived, was burned to the ground. The entire family 
lived under heavy guard by U.S. Marshals because of the numer-
ous death threats. Every other week or so we received a cryptic 
letter warning that our son Mark would never live to see age 
twenty-one. The F.B.I. analyzed the letters and found that they 
came from a middle-aged, educated, white woman. It was frustrat-
ing to learn that they could tell you everything about her except 
the color of her eyes and who the hell she was. 
We all made attempts to defuse the tension with humor. When 
the FBI warned us about car bombs, I asked my wife, Shirl, to 
start the car every morning. When she refused, I followed the 
FBl's advice to leave a pebble on the hood of the car overnight as a 
safeguard against any tampering. The practice was soon aban-
doned because I found that I was scaring myself to death! I then 
•• Richmond News Leader, August 18, 1970, at 7, col. 3. 
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took to leaving pebbles on my law clerks' cars as part of the gal-
lows humor. 
The humor soon waned, the death threats continued, and Shirl 
and Mark had to leave the country so that Merhige could devote 
himself to the integration decision. Merhige called a family confer-
ence and laid it on the line: 
These kooks shouldn't be able to run a judge off the bench. Don't 
they know how the system works? Didn't they ever take high 
school civics? I don't want to quit because it would look cowardly 
and it would hurt the system. But I'll quit if you want me to. If I 
do stay, you must leave the country because I can't concentrate and 
do the job while your lives are in danger. 
When his family was removed to safety, Merhige talked with 
Judge Clement Haynesworth about resigning. Merhige fumed, 
"This damn job isn't worth it and I'm ready to quit." Haynesworth 
replied, "Now calm down, Bob. Let me tell you of an experience I 
had." Merhige was struck by Haynesworth's modesty in failing to 
realize that the entire nation was aware of his having suffered 
through vicious personal attacks during his ill-fated nomination to 
the United States Supreme Court. Merhige concluded that if 
Haynesworth could tough it out, so could he. "O.K., forget it," he 
told Haynesworth. "I'll be back tomorrow and the next day, and 
the next day." 
Merhige never again considered resigning, and upon reflection, 
he decided it was probably a wise decision. "It hadn't occurred to 
me at the time," he explained, "but I really had nowhere to go. 
Who would hire me as a lawyer? The press had labeled me as such 
a bad guy that I couldn't have appeared before any jury in the 
state." 
The death threats continued, and Merhige received quite a few 
life insurance policies in the mail, along with a number of Fisher-
Price toy school buses. He struggled to remain dignified and prof es-
sional in the face of such vicious attacks. His staff prepared a form 
reply letter to all the correspondence, good and bad, that was re-
ceived. The standard response was that the Judge could not com-
ment on matters pending before the court, but that "he and his fam-
ily appreciate your concern and your prayers." Merhige admits a 
perverse pleasure in sending such polite replies to people who had 
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written, "You dirty S.O.B." His only regret was that he lacked the 
courage to send the form letter that a Congressman had once used: 
"Dear Mr. Smith, did you know that some jackass is writing stupid 
letters and signing your name ?"49 
Merhige handled the crank calls by stoically toughing it out: "I 
kept my name in the phone book in spite of all the crank calls be-
cause it was important to demonstrate that courts cannot be intimi-
dated. I was not going to let them change my life. Of course I was 
wrong. All the controversy and hatred did change my life. I could 
no longer appear in public." 
While Merhige struggled with the disruptions of his personal 
life, he continued to move cautiously in integrating Richmond city 
schools and the Henrico and Chesterfield county school systems. At 
the same time, a radical plan was developing to integrate the entire 
metropolitan area by consolidating Richmond city schools with the 
surrounding Henrico and Chesterfield county school systems. On 
July 6, 1970, Merhige sent a letter to all counsel suggesting that 
they consider consolidation and a community-wide plan for integra-
tion. Go The plaintiffs were intrigued by the possibility and moved to 
join the Henrico and Chesterfield school boards as defendants in the 
Bradley case. 
Merhige now faced two separate and starkly contrasting battle 
•• Merhige also lacked the creativity to handle crank calls with the flair of the NAACP lawyers, 
Oliver Hill and Sam Tucker. Tucker remembers that Merhige 
caught a lot of flack because he was viewed as a traitor to the white community. But 
I'll tell you that it was no picnic being viewed as the "uppity nigger lawyers" who 
started all the fuss. A cross was burned on Oliver's lawn, and he just called the fire 
department and went back to sleep. Oliver and I both learned to be Ieary of the police 
department because you never knew how many policemen were members of the Ku 
Klux Klan. We were compelled to handle the harassment ourselves. There was one 
period where I got a death threat over the phone every night at 2 a.m. The loss of sleep 
was worse than the threat. I refused to get an unlisted number, and I knew the police 
wouldn't do much to help. It took me quite a while to figure out how a lone black man 
could exert any power to stop these phone calls. Finally one night I told the caller, 
"You know, if I can't get any sleep I'll have to do something else with my nights. Let 
me tell you all the fun things me and your mama could be doing right now." I was 
never prosecuted for making an obscene call, and I never heard from the guy again. 
Tucker interview, supra note 7. 
00 The relevant section of the letter reads: "It may be that it would be appropriate for the defend-
ant school board to discuss with the appropriate officers of the contiguous counties as to the feasibility 
or possibility of consolidation of school districts, all of which may tend to assist them in their obliga-
tion. They may well determine to look at the prospects of a 'feeder' system, consolidation, pairing, 
zoning, etc." Bradley, 324 F. Supp. 439, 452 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
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plans for integration. The original Bradley case involved integration 
of Richmond City schools as a separate unitary system. Merhige 
continued to move cautiously in this area, reaffirming the interim 
plan and again refusing to implement the Foster plan in January 
197t.cn Moderation was less evident in the consolidation case, 
which was a radical attempt to strike at the root causes of segrega-
tion. This frontal assault upon discrimination brought the commu-
nity's resentment to the boiling point. 
Henrico and Chesterfield Counties were added as parties to the 
Bradley case in December 1970, and a motion to recuse Merhige 
for bias and prejudice was filed in January 1971.112 "The motion to 
recuse me was neither beast nor fowl," Merhige remembered: 
It was, but wasn't quite, a motion for personal disqualification. 
The school boards couched their motion in terms of a concern that 
the poor, maligned judge had taken enough heat over school inte-
gration. They expressed concern about my health and well-being, 
and suggested that I pass the burden on to another judge. Such an 
approach, even if sincere, would not persuade me to step down. I 
changed my plans to retire when the Robins Dalkon Shield case 
arose, because I couldn't retire and dump that complicated a case 
on another judge. I'd be running out on a tough baby and I just 
never have done that. 
Merhige dryly responded to the concern for his health by noting 
a judge's "obligation not to disqualify one's self, solely by reason of 
the personal burdens related to the task." Merhige was less re-
strained in responding to the charges of bias: 
Although the law required me to accept counsel's factual allega-
tions as true, I could not resist pointing out that I personally knew 
and the record reflected that the allegations were not true in fact. 
A copy of my consolidation letter was attached to the court opinion 
to illustrate how I had been misquoted by counsel. 
After taking some tongue-in-cheek jabs at counsel's motion, Mer-
hige gave serious consideration to the legal charges of bias. Prece-
dent had established that improper judicial bias must stem from an 
extra-judicial source and not merely from the judge's participation 
"' Bradley, 324 F. Supp. at 456. 
•• Id. at 439 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
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in the case.58 Merhige's "suggestion" as to consolidation arose from 
the case record - from the testimony of an expert witness that 
Richmond had physically located new schools "as near the city 
boundaries as was humanly possible" in order to prepare for future 
annexation of portions of Henrico and Chesterfield counties. 114 The 
record also reflected that in 1968 the Richmond school board re-
ceived a study report from a team of educators and social scientists 
which stated: "It is obvious that no really meaningful and stable 
racial balance is possible in the public schools unless the annexation 
issue is settled. All other solutions are dependent on finding a met-
ropolitan solution. "55 
Merhige also pointed to appellate authority for every statement 
contained in each paragraph of his consolidation letter. The lan-
guage was borrowed from Supreme Court opinions, and thus the 
letter could not be seen as an expression of his personal views. 
Judges are required to consider all options, and Merhige felt that 
he was attempting to meet the court's "obligation to assist the liti-
gants in any appropriate manner to the end that the law is con-
formed to." 
Having set the record straight on his proper judicial participation 
in the case, Merhige gave further consideration to the public per-
ception of his actions. It is an important legal maxim that the per-
ception of justice is as important as justice itself; justice must not 
only be done, it must be seen to be done. The Bradley defendants 
contended that the local and national publicity surrounding Mer-
hige's letter had created a public perception, whether erroneous or 
accurate, that Merhige would now rule upon his own suggestion. 
Counsel maintained that this perception would cause irreparable 
harm to the public's view of the judicial system. 
Merhige refused to criticize the press for its reporting, but he also 
refused to be controlled by press coverage: 
[The] news media have a right to report what they consider to be 
news. They have a right, guaranteed under the First Amendment 
to the Constitution, to be complimentary or critical of a court . 
.. See Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, 466 (6th Cir. 1956) . 
.. Bradley, 324 F. Supp. at 449. 
•• Urban Team Study on Northside Schools (November 21, 1968) prepared for the Richmond 
Schools pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare. 
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They have a right to make their own interpretations. I have been 
cited to no authority which requires that news media be temperate 
or objective or fair or unbiased. One would hope that they would 
be all of these things. But regardless of whether they are or are 
not, courts would cease to operate if . . . the rights of the public 
and litigants are affected to such an extent as to permit the manner 
of treatment of news to control the court.116 
Merhige methodically explained why he would refuse to disqual-
ify himself from the case, but this did not prevent further efforts to 
divest him of authority. In February 1971, the defendants entered a 
request for a three-judge panel to take jurisdiction of the case.117 
Under existing law, a three-judge panel was required whenever a 
federal district court enjoined or restrained any state official from 
executing a state statute. The defendants contended that consolida-
tion would require them to violate a statutory directive that "[t]he 
public schools in each county, city, and town operating as a separate 
school district shall be free to each person. . . . " 118 
Merhige refused to yield to a three-judge panel because other 
Virginia statutes clearly provided for the creation and operation of 
consolidated school systems which included independent cities and 
counties.119 After losing on the motion for a three-judge panel, the 
Henrico and Chesterfield school boards made one last effort to 
avoid Merhige's jurisdiction by claiming that they could not prop-
erly be joined as parties to the Bradley case.60 When Merhige de-
nied that procedural claim, he was able to "get back to moving the 
two Bradley cases toward a conclusion on the merits." 
In April 1971, Merhige replaced the functioning interim plan 
with a plan which would establish integrated schools in Richmond, 
to the maximum extent that it was possible to do so, while the city 
operated as an independent school district. 61 The dilemma Merhige 
faced was how to accomplish meaningful integration in a city which 
was already 66 percent black and becoming increasingly so. Noting 
that the Bradley consolidation case was still pending before the 
•• Bradley, 324 F. Supp. at 448. 
•
7 Id. at 397. 
oe Id. (Citing Va. Code § 22-218 (1969 Repl. Vol). 
•• See Bradley, 462 F.2d at 1071 n.3 (Winter, J., dissenting) for an explanation of these statutes. 
•• Bradley, 324 F. Supp. at 401. 
•
1 Bradley, 325 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
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court, Merhige instructed the school board that court approval of 
the Richmond integration plan was conditional on the plan operat-
ing as projected: "The Constitution is satisfied only when an inte-
gration plan 'works' in practice and not merely on paper."62 Mer-
hige warned that continued bus-dodging and white flight to the 
suburbs would render the plan impotent and leave consolidation as 
the only course for true integration. 
Merhige recognized that the problem of white flight made it 
nearly impossible to stabilize integration in Richmond. Historically, 
as the pressure for integration mounted, the migration of whites ac-
celerated. 68 Every increase in federal pressure for integration re-
duced the relative number of white students in the city school sys-
tem. The efforts to avoid integration occasionally resulted in 
spectacular and well-publicized forms of bus-dodging. One affluent 
Richmonder assigned to a ghetto school simply had her father rent 
her an apartment in her old school district. Another Richmonder 
with two school age children switched homes with a married daugh-
ter living in 92 percent white Chesterfield County. 
Balanced against these spectacular examples of bus-dodging were 
some touching instances of compliance with court-ordered busing. 
Governor Linwood Holton performed what some viewed as "the 
single most courageous act in the politics of busing."64 Holton en-
rolled his 13-year-old daughter in predominantly black John F. 
Kennedy High School, while his two younger children were the 
only whites in their respective middle-school classrooms. "It's al-
ways hard for a child to change schools," he explained. "They don't 
want to leave old friends. But my children go where they are as-
signed. "66 Holton's act was all the more heroic in light of the fact 
that the governor's mansion was on state, not city, property and 
thus exempt from Merhige's busing decree. Holton spoke as a par-
ent when he assured other parents that the children were "going to 
be all right." He spoke as a governor when he commented: 
0 Id. at 847. 
aa From 1954 to 1971, the percentage of whites in Richmond schools had dropped from 57 to 31 
percent, while the percentage in Henrico and Chesterfield Counties had exploded by some 250 
percent. 
"' J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke I 53 (1979) . 
.. Id. 
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"They're going to give this as much leadership as you can expect 
from 11 to 13-year-olds, which is right much."66 
Unfortunately, not all Richmonders followed Bolton's leadership. 
Much of the school board's litigation in the Bradley case was inten-
tionally designed to afford whites the time to maneuver their way 
out of integrated schools. Merhige recognized this bad faith by or-
dering the Richmond school board to pay costs and attorney's fees 
for the Bradley plaintiffs.67 
In this final court battle of the Richmond City integration case, 
the Bradley plaintiffs contended that, as the unwilling victims of 
illegal discrimination, they had been forced to bear the crushing ex-
pense of enforcing their constitutional rights in some ten years of 
litigation. They asked that $56,000 in costs and attorney's fees be 
assessed against the Richmond School Board. 'Generally, courts do 
not reimburse victorious litigants for the full price of their victory. 
However, Merhige observed that an exception exists "when a party 
has used the litigation process for ends other than the legitimate 
resolution of actual legal disputes. "68 Merhige found that the pro-
tracted history of the Bradley case had been caused by the school 
board's "unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy."69 It was apparent to 
him that the school board had defaulted from its constitutional duty 
since 1968, and thus it was "not unfair to say that the litigation was 
unnecessary. "70 
Merhige found that in addition to imposing needless litigation on 
the plaintiffs and the judicial system, the school board had also vio-
lated its public trust by failing to adhere promptly to constitutional 
requirements: "It inspired in a community conditioned to segregated 
schools a false hope that constitutional interpretations as enunciated 
by the courts . . . could in some manner . . . be influenced by the 
sentiment of a community."71 The community was further outraged 
when Merhige summoned the school board members to his court-
room and threatened them with contempt if the costs were not paid 
.. Id. at 153-54. 
" Bradley, 53 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va. 1971) . 
.. Id. at 36. 
•• Id. at 39 (quoting Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 321 (6th Cir. 1965)). 
•o Id. 
11 Id. at 40-41. 
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to the plaintiffs by the end of the day. In the view of many white 
Richmonders, Merhige had done his worst and was now adding 
insult to injury by requiring the losers to pay costs to the victors. 
The worst, however, was yet to come. 
On January 10, 1972, Merhige issued a 181-page opinion order-
ing consolidation of the Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield school 
systems.72 The Richmond Times-Dispatch called the lengthy opin-
ion "a nauseating mixture of vacuous sociological theories."73 For 
others, Merhige's opinion was an examination of the effects of ra-
cial discrimination, the embarrassing history of Virginia's massive 
resistance era, and a fulfillment of the promise of Brown v. Board 
of Education. In time, the opinion has come to be seen as neither a 
philosophical treatise on the evils of racial discrimination, nor an 
outpouring of moral indignation. Rather, the opinion reflects the 
man - practical, patriotic, legalistic. 
Merhige's patriotic and legalistic side caused him dutifully to fol-
low the Supreme Court's mandate "to take whatever steps might be 
necessary to convert to a unitary (school) system in which racial 
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."7• His practi-
cal bent led him to examine the root causes of segregation in 
Richmond. 
Eight years after President Lyndon Johnson had declared a "war 
on poverty," Merhige presented a depressing picture of the cycle of 
poverty in which Richmond's blacks had been trapped by racial dis-
crimination. He noted that inferior segregated schools limited the 
educational achievements of blacks, and that even in the absence of 
employment discrimination, this deficient education depressed po-
tential earning power and restricted choice of employment. This in 
turn narrowed the range of housing options, and confined poor 
blacks to low-cost central city sites, near public transportation and 
low-skilled jobs. The poor housing areas locked the children into 
attending inferior schools, thus perpetuating the cycle of poverty for 
the next generation.711 For Merhige, "The present is simply a cul-
'" Bradley, 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
71 Richmond-Times Dispatch, Jan. 11, 1972, at A14, col 1. See also No Place to Hide, Time, Jan. 
24, 1972, at 38. 
" Bradley, 338 F. Supp. at 101 (citing Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968)). 
•• Id. at 85. 
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mination of the past and, unless action is taken, a prophecy for the 
future."76 
Merhige believes that the logic of his findings was clear: "I found 
- and this really upset people - that the cycle of poverty and the 
policy of containing blacks within urban ghettoes were the products 
of past wrongs by educational authorities of the State." The massive 
resistance movement and the protracted litigation in the Bradley 
case itself portrayed "( t]he sordid history of Virginia's and Rich-
mond's attempts to circumvent, defeat and nullify" all attempts at 
integration. 77 "Each move in the agonizingly slow process of deseg-
regation [had] been taken unwillingly and under coercion."78 
In light of these past practices, Merhige concluded that the 
State's insistence upon separate attendance districts within the met-
ropolitan community reflected the desire of state and local officials 
to maintain as great a degree of segregation as possible. He ex-
pressed incredulity that any school administrator could plead igno-
rance of the effects of past discrimination. State and local officials 
had been bombarded with surveys, reports, and recommendations 
regarding the magnitude of the problem and the depth of the dis-
crimination. "Informed of the consequences of past discrimination," 
wrote Merhige, "they knowingly renewed or entrenched it. '[I]t was 
action taken with knowledge of the consequences, and the conse-
quences were not merely possible, they were substantially certain. 
Under such conditions the action was unquestionably willful.' "79 In 
the absence of nonracial reasons for adhering to political subdivision 
boundaries as school attendance limits, Merhige concluded that the 
State's insistence on using such boundaries had to be predicated on 
its known racial effects. 
For Merhige, the case record established the fact of past and pre-
sent discrimination. From this fact could be inf erred the intent to 
discriminate in the future. White flight was possible only so long as 
white schools were maintained in the politically separate counties. 
Merhige observed that "the power to temper the marked racial 
identifiability of the three school systems exists, and it has gone un-
71 Id. at 115. 
77 Bradley, 462 F.2d 1058, 1075 (4th Cir. 1973) Q. Winter, dissenting). 
•• Bradley, 338 F. Supp. at 103. 
" Id. at 113 (quoting Keyes v. School Dist. Number One, 303 F. Supp. 279, 286 (D. Colo. 1969)). 
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used. "80 Once Merhige satisfied himself as to the factual situation 
and the discriminatory intent of the educational authorities, all that 
remained was to determine whether any legal principles barred the 
remedy of consolidation. 
The Bradley defendants invoked the banner of States' Rights and 
the sanctity of political boundaries as a bar to consolidation. This 
argument, however, was seriously weakened by Virginia's own his-
tory of discarding political boundaries during the massive resistance 
era. In 1956, the General Assembly had created the State Pupil 
Placement Board and authorized that agency to enroll and place 
every school age child in the state independent of local school au-
thorities. 81 The General Assembly had also authorized the Gover-
nor to divest local school boards of all authority over integrated 
schools.82 The state tuition grant system had funded the transfer of 
white children across school district lines to attend school in other 
districts which remained segregated.88 The State School Board had 
even paid for the transportation of students to other states in segre-
gated groups.tu For Merhige, such practices "demonstrate[d] as a 
matter of historical fact the insubstantiality of any argument that 
strong state concerns support[ed] [the maintenance of school district 
boundaries] as barriers to the achievement of integration."85 
History aside, a large portion of school operating funds were re-
ceived from the state.86 The curriculums, school textbooks, mini-
mum teachers' salaries and many other school procedures were gov-
erned by state law. Merhige reached the inescapable conclusion that 
public schools are primarily administered on a state-wide basis. 
Thus, local school boundaries could be adjusted to achieve a com-
munity-wide solution to the problems of segregation. 
Merhige felt compelled to institute a metropolitan community-
wide solution to Richmond's segregated schools, for effective inte-
80 Id. at 85. 
11 Id. at 138. 
'" Id. at 140. When 17 black students were assigned by the Norfolk School Board to six formerly 
all-white schools, the Governor of Virginia closed the six schools, and sent in the state police to 
enforce the closing. 
1a Id. at 94-95. 
04 Id. at 83. Sam Tucker ruefully recalls that he had to "bootleg" his education in the District of 
Columbia. Tucker interview, supra note 7. 
1a Bradley, 338 F. Supp. at 84. 
88 Id. at 118-19. 
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gration was not possible within the existing school division bounds. 
Richmond had lost 39 percent of its white students in the previous 
two years, so there were few whites left with whom to integrate. 
The evidence demonstrated to Merhige that racial disparities "were 
so great that the only remedy promising of immediate success - not 
to speak of stable solutions - involve[ d] crossing" existing school 
district lines. 87 
Merhige's decision removed the final barrier to integration; the 
affluent white suburbs were now open for integration with urban 
blacks. The Richmond community was ripe for violence, but Mer-
hige refused to back down or offer any excuses. In a nationally tele-
vised CBS interview he defended his decision to order integration 
while permitting his eleven year old son, Mark, to attend an exclu-
sive private academy: "When I'm on the bench I'm a judge, and 
when I'm at home I'm just a father. Mark attends a private school 
because that's where I think he can get the best education and I 
make no apologies for it." Merhige acknowledged his resentment 
over the numerous death threats and harassing phone calls which 
"upset my wife and child. My little boy, I think, suffers more than 
anybody. He doesn't go off the property without a marshall, nor 
does Mrs. Merhige." Lest anyone mistake his concern as a plea for 
mercy, Merhige coolly stared into the television camera and an-
nounced, "I want you to understand that we are not afraid. I only 
hope they (the callers) would understand, whoever they are, that it's 
not going to change one single thing, whether it's me or any other 
judge." 
In light of the explosive situation, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals took extraordinary steps to placate the aroused community. 
The Fourth Circuit held a "pre-trial" meeting of the parties and 
attorneys - an unusual, if not unprecedented step. At the meeting 
the Court issued an immediate stay of Merhige's order, agreed to 
hear the case en bane, advanced the case on the docket, dispensed 
with the rule requiring printed briefs, and agreed to hear oral argu-
ments within two months of Merhige's decision. Clearly the consoli-
dation case was not to be treated as a normal case. 
The most extraordinary maneuver was the Fourth Circuit's sub-
17 Id. at 100. 
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sequent decision to issue a press statement pointing out that Mer-
hige had acted courageously in doing what he felt was compelled by 
law. Merhige still fumes at this maneuver: "Since when do appel-
late courts issue press releases saying what a nice guy the trial judge 
is?" 
Nice guy or not, the Fourth Circuit reversed Merhige by a vote 
of five to one.88 The court rested its decision on a repudiation of 
Merhige's factual findings and a reinterpretation of the legal princi-
ples he applied. 
Through his factual findings, Merhige had established that offi-
cials of Richmond, Henrico, Chesterfield, and the Commonwealth 
of Virginia had by their· actions directly contributed to the continu-
ing existence of a segregated school system in the metropolitan area. 
The fact that the development and growth of a segregated situation 
came slowly and surreptitiously rather than by legislative pro-
nouncement made the situation no less evil. Merhige's legal conclu-
sion had been that desegregation could not be subordinated to politi-
cal boundaries. Virginia was required to rid itself of segregation 
and could not "escape its constitutional obligations by relinquishing 
or delegating to local authorities the authority to discriminate."89 
The school boundary lines were hardly inviolate; they were cre-
ations of the state itself and, like water or sewer districts, could be 
altered to form other districts. 90 
The Fourth Circuit first attacked Merhige's finding that there 
had been invidious intent to discriminate, noting that the county 
and school boundary lines had been in existence for over one hun-
dred years. Neither party had argued that invidious intent to dis-
criminate had motivated the creation of these boundaries, nor had 
there been any evidence that either past or present adherence to 
existing boundary lines indicated a purpose to perpetuate discrimi-
nation in the public schools.91 The court acknowledged the existence 
of segregated housing in Richmond, but refused to follow Merhige 
in attributing that condition to segregated schools: 
We think that the root causes of the concentration of blacks in the 
88 Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1973). 
•• Bradley, 338 F. Supp. at 102. . 
00 Id. at 103. 
•• Bradley, 462 F.2d at 1064. 
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inner cities of America are simply not known and that the district 
court could not realistically place on the counties the responsibility 
for the effect that inner city decay has had on the public schools of 
Richmond . . . Whatever the basic causes, it has not been school 
assignments, and school assignments cannot reverse the trend . . . 
A school case, like a vehicle, can carry only a limited amount of 
baggage.92 
The circuit court found that each of the three previously segre-
gated school districts had been desegregated,98 and that each unitary 
district could now be maintained without constitutional violation.94 
The continuation of the three individual systems did not impair a 
federally protected right, because there is no right to racial balance 
within a single school district, only the right to attend a unitary 
school system.911 Once Merhige had removed state-imposed segrega-
tion from the Richmond city school district, further court interven-
tion in the absence of invidious state action was neither necessary 
nor justifiable. Merhige was reversed because he had erred in his 
finding of government intent to discriminate, and erred in his legal 
conclusion that the Constitution required racial balance. 
The true basis for the reversal may have. been the budgeting and 
financial problems of implementing consolidation, problems which 
the Fourth Circuit said "boggle the mind".98 In Virginia, school 
boards cannot levy taxes or appropriate funds, and thus they must 
look to city council or the county commissioners for support and 
approval. A consolidated school district would have had to deal with 
three politically distinct bodies - the Richmond City Council and 
the county commissioners of Henrico and Chesterfield Counties -
each of which had a separate power base. 97 The obvious fear was 
that white suburbanites would not appropriate funds to pay for 
black city schools.98 
Merhige could garner only one supporter on the Fourth Circuit. 
11 Id. at 1066. 
•• Id. at 1067. 
"' Id. at 1069. 
81 Id. (relying on the holding in Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 24 (1971). 
" Id. at 1068. 
"' Id. 
88 Although these administrative considerations were significant, the Fourth Circuit conceded that 
state political subdivisions could not be used to circumvent the equal protection right of blacks to 
attend non-segregated schools. Id. at 1068-69. 
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In his dissent, Judge Winter began by noting that in an earlier case 
the majority had approved the dismantling of larger school districts 
into smaller districts which would be more segregated.99 Thus, their 
decision in Bradley to prevent consolidation of smaller segregated 
districts to create a larger integrated district was predictable.100 
Judge Winter also objected to the majority's categorization of 
Merhige's order as a plan for racial balance. Winter agreed with 
Merhige that consolidation had been ordered "to weed out the ef-
fects of past discriminatory practices, especially as they were per-
mitted to proliferate by Virginia's long-deferred compliance with 
Brown v. Board of Education."101 Winter also agreed with Mer-
hige that the operation of the fourteenth amendment could not de-
pend on how a state elects to subdivide itself, and that the obligation 
to dismantle the dual school system exists regardless of political 
subdivisions.102 
Before the Supreme Court, Merhige's decision was permanently 
relegated to legal limbo where he could be neither vindicated nor 
chastised. As a former chairman of the Richmond School Board, 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. declined to participate in the case. The 
remaining Justices split four to four, which meant that the Fourth 
Circuit's reversal was left in effect.103 
Subsequent cases such as Milliken v. Bradley10• have made it 
appear likely that Merhige would have stood reversed if Justice 
Powell had not disqualified himself. In Milliken, a. federal district 
judge in Detroit had agreed with Merhige that "[ s ]chool district 
lines are simply matters of political convenience and may not be 
used to deny constitutional rights. "105 The only distinction between 
the Richmond and Detroit cases was that Judge Stephen Roth of 
Detroit did not order elimination of school lines. Instead he ordered 
that students be bussed across school lines in order to integrate the 
" Bradley, 462 F.2d at 1071 & n.t. Judge Winter was referring to Wright v. Council of Emporia, 
442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Fourth Circuit, and 
upheld Merhige's finding that the dismantling plan was impermissible. Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 
(1972). 
100 Bradley, 462 F .2d at 1071. 
101 Id. at 1079. 
10
• Id. at 1078. 
102 School Bd. v. State Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973). 
104 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
10
• Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 244 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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city and county schools. 
Chief Justice Burger, echoing his dissent in the Emporia case, 
wrote the majority opinion reversing Judge Roth. 108 It was clear 
that Judge Roth and Judge Merhige had pushed the Supreme 
Court further than it was willing to go. The Court's response to 
these lower-court decisions was perhaps prophesied by an 19th cen-
tury case which stated: "[T]here must be some stage, in the progress 
of his elevation when [the black man] takes the rank of a mere citi-
zen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws .... "107 
Because of the Supreme Court's continuing vacillation over re-
verse discrimination, racial hiring quotas, and affirmative action, a 
final verdict has not been rendered on the special status of blacks.108 
Merhige remains noncommittal when reflecting upon the consolida-
tion decision. He will not express an opinion as to whether the 
Richmond metropolitan area is in better or worse condition because 
of the Bradley case. Pragmatically, he observes that there would 
have been less busing if consolidation had been approved. "I know 
the price of busing was high," he concedes, "but I don't think there 
is any price too high to reach a society where everyone is viewed the 
way God intended, the way the Constitution intended. Viewed and 
treated equally." 
About one year after the consolidation case, Merhige received a 
call from one of the Fourth Circuit judges who had voted to reverse 
him in Bradley. The judge had taken an evening walk through 
Richmond and told Merhige, "Bob, I think you were right. Rich-
mond is turning into a poor black city. Maybe we were wrong in 
reversing you." Merhige replied, "I know you were wrong. We, the 
American people, haven't always been so smart in our selection of 
political and judicial leaders. But God is forgiving and has a special 
view of America. If He didn't, we have messed it up so badly that 
we would be in terrible shape. I believe that whatever happened, it 
happened for the best." 
Merhige still remembers the Bradley case as one of those fortui-
tous occurrences when the law and a judge's personal views coin-
•oe Milliken, 418 U.S. at 721 (Powell, J., joining in the majority opinion). 
1
"' Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
108 See, e.g., Wygant v. Board of Educ., 106 S.Ct. 1842 (1986), for a recent instance in which a 
badly-divided Court struggled with this politically sensitive question. 
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cide. Judges must often apply a law they do not agree with, but the 
weight of decision rests easier when the judge can believe that he is 
serving justice as well as applying the formal law. Merhige ac-
knowledges that a lot of hatred was directed at him because of it, 
yet he reaffirms today his statements from the bench when the case 
was decided: 
I'm ashamed and embarrassed that we let these things develop. 
Who said this stupid thing about human beings riding on the back 
of the bus? Who said this stupid thing about not letting people live 
where they choose? Integration is not only the law, it's the right 
thing to do. And I feel good about doing the right thing. 
